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COMMENT
DOES PRETEXT PLUS AGE EQUAL THE SUM OF THE
JUDGMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding cases under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA),' several circuit courts of appeals have inter-
preted the tripartite test set forth in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green2 to mean that a plaintiff could prevail in proving individ-
ual disparate treatment by proving a prima facie case and that
the employer's proffered reasons were a pretext. The Third,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits concluded that a showing that a
proffered justification is pretextual is equivalent to a finding
that the employer intentionally discriminated.3 In other words,
"the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when,
in the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff
has persuaded the factfinder that the defendant's proffered,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged adverse
action was not the true reason."4 This approach is known as
"pretext-only." On the other hand, the First Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit adopted what is known as the "pretext-plus"
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
2. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a further explanation of the McDonnell Douglas test
see infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
3. See McDoy v. WGN Television, 957 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1992); Brooks v.
Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1988); Chipollini v.
Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1987).
4. Louis M. Rappaport, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Su-
preme Court Turned Its Back On Title VII By Rejecting 'Pretext-Only?," 39 VIL.. L.
REV. 123, 133 (1994).
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approach.' Applying this standard, the plaintiff cannot prevail
unless he proves both that the employer's proffered reason was
false and that the real reason was age discrimination. The
plaintiff is required not only to persuade the trier of fact that
the employer's proffered reasons for the employment decision
were false, but also to provide some additional evidence of dis-
criminatory animus to persuade the trier of fact that the true
reason was age discrimination.6
In 1993, the Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks7 ostensibly resolved the aforementioned split
among the circuit courts. This Comment will examine whether
Hicks resolved the "pretext-only" versus "pretext-plus" contro-
versy as it relates specifically to the ADEA. Part II reviews the
background of the ADEA. Part III briefly reviews the Hicks
decisions-in the district court, the Eighth Circuit, and the
United States Supreme Court-including a comparison of the
Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV
examines decisions by a number of federal circuit courts that
are representative of the three approaches the Hicks decision
has generated. Part V analyzes the three approaches, and final-
ly, Part VI concludes that the third approach, the modified test,
combining the "pretext-plus" and "pretext-only" standards, is the
most appropriate.
II. BACKGROUND
On January 23, 1967, President Johnson delivered a special
message to Congress in which he proposed that Congress enact
a law prohibiting arbitrary and unjust discrimination in em-
ployment because of age.8 He stated:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily
retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age dis-
crimination. Despite our present low rate of unemployment,
there has been a persistent average of 850,000 people age
5. See Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1991) Duke v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991).
6. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at 137-38.
7. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
8. See 113 CoNG. REc. 1089 (1967).
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45 and over who are unemployed. Today more than three
quarters of a billion dollars in unemployment insurance is
paid each year to workers who are 45 and over. They com-
prise 27 percent of all unemployed, and 40 percent of the
long term unemployed .... In economic terms, this is a
serious and senseless loss to a nation on the move.9
On December 15, 1967, President Johnson signed into law
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.10 The
ADEA proscribes age discrimination in employment of persons
at least forty years of age." The most notable section makes it
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age."' In enacting the statute, Congress declared that "older
workers [found] themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to re-
tain employment, and especially to regain employment when
displaced from jobs;"' that "the setting of arbitrary age limits
regardless of potential for job performance [had] become a com-
mon practice;"14 that among older workers there was a "high
incidence of unemployment;"' and that discrimination because
of age "burden[ed] commerce and the free flow of goods in com-
merce."'
6
Since the enactment of the ADEA, the United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted the ADEA by borrowing, in many
respects, from other federal employment laws.' The procedural
principles of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' for ex-
9. ILLINOIs DEPARTMENT OF AGING AND THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA,
AGE DIScRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT OF OLDER PERSONS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT 46 (1977).
10. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
621.634 (1994)).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1994).
12. Id. § 623(a)(1).
13. Id. § 621(aX1).
14. Id. § 621(aX2).
15. Id. § 621(aX3).
16. Id. § 621(aX4).
17. See DANIEL P. OMEARA, PROTECTING THE GROWING NUMBER OF OLDER WORK-
ERS: THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 8 (1989).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
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ample, have guided the interpretation of the ADEA.' The Su-
preme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green ° established a
tripartite test articulating the allocation of burdens and stan-
dards of proof for individuals alleging disparate treatment un-
der Title VII.2 Disparate treatment "is the most easily under-
stood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."' The test announced by the
McDonnell Douglas Court allowed a plaintiff to prove intention-
al discrimination through circumstantial evidence. Therefore,
the test is not applicable when the plaintiff can prove discrim-
ination directly.' The three-part test requires a plaintiff-em-
ployee to present a prima facie case that he or she was a vic-
tim of intentional discrimination.' Once the employee has suc-
cessfully established a prima facie case, the employer must
then demonstrate that a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
existed for the adverse job action.' Next, the employee is al-
lowed to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is a
pretext for intentional discrimination."6
The Court subsequently refined the nature of the respective
burdens on the employee and employer in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine7 The Court in Burdine empha-
sized that the burden, which shifted to the employer after the
19. See OMEARA, supra note 17, at 8-9.
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. See id. at 802.
22. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
23. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
24. See id. at 802. A typical prima facie case involving age discrimination is: (1)
that the plaintiff was within the protected age group; (2) that the plaintiff was quali-
fied for the position; (3) the plaintiff was discharged; or demoted and (4) that the dis-
charge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.
This fourth requirement usually involves being replaced by a younger person. In
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996), however,
the Supreme Court held that the younger replacement does not have to be outside of
the protected class, so long as the plaintiff has lost out because of his age. A typical
prima facie case involving a reduction-in-force age discrimination case is: (1) that the
plaintiff belonged to the protected age group; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified to
assume another position had it been available at the time the plaintiff was dis-
charged; (3) the plaintiff was discharged; and (4) that the discharge occurred under
circumstances suggesting that age was a factor.
25. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26. See id. at 804.
27. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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employee had established a prima facie case, was a burden of
producing evidence in support of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for discharge. 8 The burden of persuasion never shifts;
the employer's burden is only a burden of production, not per-
suasion.' These two United States Supreme Court cases set
the standard for proving intentional discrimination in employ-
ment cases and have been relied upon by courts for over a
decade.
At one time, the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas for-
mula to the ADEA was widely disputed.0 Many writers
thought that Title VII standards should not be applied to
ADEA cases because the Supreme Court had previously distin-
guished age discrimination from race discrimination under an
equal protection analysis of the U.S. Constitution. 1 The Su-
preme Court has implied, however, that the McDonnell Douglas
framework is applicable under the ADEA."2  Further, in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,' the parties did
not dispute the application of the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis.' In that case, the Court assumed that some variant of the
basic evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas applied to
ADEA cases.' The Court did not decide this point, but it did
not disparage the notion, despite the opportunity to do so.
III. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HIcKS16
A. Factual and Procedural History
St. Mary's Honor Center was a halfway house operated by
the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resourc-
28. See id. at 254.
29. See id. at 257.
30. See 0MEARA, supra note 17, at 101.
31. See Patricia K Rea, Comment, Coming of Age: Unique and Independent Treat-
nent of the ADEA, 7 A. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 583, 594-95 (1984).
32. See O'MEARA, supra note 17, at 102 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.4;
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)) (implying that the
McDonnell Douglas formula is appropriate if direct evidence does not exist).
33. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
34. See id. at 1309-10.
35. See id.
36. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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es. 7 St. Mary's hired Melvin Hicks, an African-American male,
as a correctional officer in August 1978, and promoted him to
shift commander in February 1980.8 In 1984, St. Mary's un-
derwent extensive supervisory changes.39 Hicks "had enjoyed a
satisfactory employment record, but soon thereafter became the
subject of repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary ac-
tions."' St. Mary's subsequently suspended, demoted, and fi-
nally discharged Hicks.4'
Hicks brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri against St. Mary's, alleging
that his termination and prior demotion were racially motivated
and violated Title VII.42 Hicks established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination,' but St. Mary's rebutted the presump-
tion of race discrimination by articulating two nondiscriminato-
ry reasons for Hicks' discharge." Hicks then proved that the
reasons given for his demotion and termination were
pretextual.' The district court nevertheless granted judgment
for St. Mary's. The court concluded that Hicks had proved the
employer's reasons were false, but he failed to satisfy his ulti-
mate burden of proving that race was the determining factor in
the decision.' The court wrote "[ilt is clear that John Powell
had placed plaintiff on the express track to termination .... It
is not clear, however, that plaintiffs race was the motivation
for the harsh discipline."47 The court opined that the real rea-
37. See id. at 504.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 505.
41. See id.
42. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd,
970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
43. See id. at 1249. Hicks proved his prima facie case by showing (1) he was
black; (2) he was qualified for the position as shift commander, (3) he was demoted
from his position as shift commander and was ultimately discharged, and (4) that the
position remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man. See id. at 1249-50.
44. See id. at 1250. St. Mary's articulated two nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions: (1) the severity of; and (2) the accumulation of rules violations committed by
respondent. See id.
45. See id. at 1251.
46. See id. at 1251-52.
47. Id. at 1251.
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son behind the supervisor's actions may have been personal
dislike rather than impermissible racial motivations."
Hicks appealed to the Eight Circuit, which overruled the
district court and aligned itself with the "pretext-only" ap-
proach.49 The court stated that "[o]nce plaintiff proved all of
defendants' proffered reasons for the adverse employment ac-
tions to be pretextual, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."" The court also held that "[b]ecause all of
defendants' proffered reasons were discredited, defendants...
were in no better position than if they had remained silent,
offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had
unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his
race."51 The court noted that in the past, the Eighth Circuit
had determined that the plaintiff had met his burden of proof
at the pretext stage when he proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that all of the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons were not the true reasons for the adverse employment
action; no additional proof of discrimination was required.52
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Majority Opinion
The Court granted St. Mary's Honor Center's petition for
certiorari to determine whether a judgment for the plaintiff was
mandated, in a suit against an employer alleging intentional
discrimination, when the trier of fact had rejected the
employer's asserted reasons for its actions.' Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's
48. See id. at 1252.
49. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'g 756 F.
Supp. 1244, rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
50. Id. at 492.
51. Id.
52. See Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting the "pretext-plus" approach); Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 795 & n.7 (8th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting the "pretext-plus" approach); Brooks v. Monroe Sys. for Bus., Inc.,
873 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir. 1989).
53. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Thomas).
54. See id. at 504.
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approval of the "pretext-only" approach. In doing so, Justice
Scalia first analogized the presumption of unlawful dis-
crimination that arises after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case to other presumptions described in Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence." In other words, the presumption
shifts the burden of production to the defendant, but the plain-
tiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion that the defen-
dant intentionally discriminated against him." Justice Scalia
noted that Hicks did not challenge the finding that St. Mary's
sustained its burden of production.57 He also stated that '[i]f
the defendant carries this burden of production, the presump-
tion raised by the prima facie case is rebutted."58 Further-
more, "[t]he presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the
defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops
out of the picture."59 The remaining question is whether the
plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against [him] because of his race."' The majority stated:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons,
will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was
correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o addi-
tional proof of discrimination is required.""'
55. See id. at 506.
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut
or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was ordinarily cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301.
56. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.
57. See id. at 507.
58. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255
(1981)).
59. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11 (citing Burdine, 480 U.S. at 255).
60. Id. at 511 (alteration in original) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
61. Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Hon-
or Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
854
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The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the circuit court
erred in holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered rea-
son compelled judgment for the plaintiff, because this "disre-
gard[ed] the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presump-
tion does not shift the burden of proof."62
The Court then analyzed the language of Burdine to support
its interpretation of the requisites necessary to prove discrimi-
nation." The Court first addressed the language in Burdine
describing the third step of the McDonnell Douglas test:
"[t]hird, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff
must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defen-
dant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimi-
nation." The Court in Hicks interpreted this to mean that "a
reason cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination'
unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason."" As a result, the majority
believed that when the Burdine Court referred to "pretext," it
used this term to refer to "pretext for discrimination."'
The majority also understood that the new factual inquiry
following the defendant's burden of production, as described by
the Burdine Court, would turn not to generalized factors used
to establish a prima facie case, but to specific proofs and rebut-
tals of discriminatory motivation.67 Further, the Court cited
Burdine as stating: "[p]lacing [the] burden of production on the
defendant thus serves ... to frame the factual issue with
sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext."" The majority understood
this sentence to mean that the purpose of the burden of pro-
duction is to address the form, not the substance, of the
defendant's burden of production.69 In other words, requiring
the defendant to "'clearly set forth" its reasons for its actions
62. See id.
63. See id. at 515-20.
64. Id. at 515 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
65. Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 516 & n.6.
67. See id.
68. Id. (alteration in original).
69. See id.
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provides the plaintiff with a 'full and fair" opportunity to re-
but these reasons.70 According to the majority, the evidentiary
framework in the burden shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas
was more a procedural device, and was not designed to pin the
defendant down to a substantive position: "[t]he formula is
intended only as a tool to be used in the evidentiary inquiry
into whether discrimination occurred. The McDonnell Douglas
scheme does not alter the way in which evidence is presented
at trial, and thus simply offers a framework for grouping and
selecting various facts."7'
Next, the majority referred to the Burdine language guaran-
teeing the plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate that the
reasons given by the defendant were not the true reasons for
the employment decision. It concluded that "'[t]his burden now
merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that
she has been the victim of intentional discrimination." 72 The
majority stated that this language meant that "proving the
employer's reasons false bec[ame] part of... the greater en-
terprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrim-
ination.""3
In addition, the majority dismissed as dicta the language in
Burdine permitting a plaintiff to succeed in proving intentional
discrimination indirectly by showing that the employer's reasons
were unworthy of credence.74 The majority in Hicks opined
that this "dictum contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous
other statements, both in Burdine itself and in our later
caselaw .... .'
The majority admitted one difficulty in its interpretation of
Burdine, but deemed it to be eliminated by its previous decision
in Aikens.76 The Court, referring to its opinion in Aikens, stat-
70. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255
(1981)).
71. O'MEARA, supra note 17, at 98-99 (citing Kimberly K. Fayssoux, Note, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for
Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 627 (1987)).
72. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 at 256).
73. Id. at 517.
74. See id.
75. Id.




ed that "the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non."77 In
other words, after the defendant has responded to plaintiffs
prima facie case, the question is not "whether defendant's re-
sponse is credible, but 'whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff."'78 Finally, the majority re-
affirmed what Aikens established earlier:
[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is
both sensitive and difficult.... There will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental process-
es. But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing
courts should treat discrimination differently from other
ultimate questions of fact. Nor should they make their in-
quiry even more difficult by applying legal rules which were
devised to govern 'the basic allocation of burdens and order
of presentation of proof,' in deciding this ultimate
question. 9
The majority in Hicks, therefore, held that the trier of fact's
rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its employment
actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of
law.80
2. The Dissenting Opinion s'
Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, contending that
the majority had abandoned, after two decades of stable law,
the practical framework established in McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine.2 Since there was seldom 'eyewitness' testimony re-
garding the employer's mental processes, the McDonnell Doug-
las framework allowed the use of circumstantial evidence to
prove intentional discrimination." Justice Souter disagreed
with the majority's view that the only function served by the
77. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518 (alteration in original) (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at
714).
78. Id. at 519 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715).
79. Id. at 524 (quoting Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252 (1981); Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
80. Id. at 502.
81. Id. at 525-43. (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Souter was joined by Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens).
82. See id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 526 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
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articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons by the
defendants was to rebut the presumption of discrimination.'
He wrote that the burden of production on the defendant gave
the eniployer the "right to choose the scope of the factual issues
to be resolved by the factfinder.""5 Permitting the employer to
do this was meaningless unless the employer and the plaintiff
were bound to what the employer declared. 8
The dissent attacked the majority's attempt to reconcile
Burdine with its decision in Hicks. The majority's effort to re-
place the word "pretext" with "pretext for discrimination" in the
Burdine decision was one such example."7 Justice Souter stat-
ed that he seriously doubted that such a change in diction
would have altered the meaning of the passages where "pretext"
occurred.' Further, according to the dissent, the majority's
repudiation of the passage in Burdine changed Burdine's explic-
it language of "either... or" into a "both... and."" The
language in Burdine that Justice Souter was referring to specif-
ically stated that a plaintiff may prove discrimination "either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." 0 The corresponding passage in the majority's opin-
ion stated that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason."9' Justice
Souter stated that the majority's "both... and" language was
84. See id. at 529 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also noted that it does not
make sense for the employer to give reasons that are clear and specific if the
factfinder is later permitted to rely on reasons not clearly given or not given at all
so that the factfinder can rule in favor of the employer. See id.
87. See id. at 530 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also stated that even if the
majority was correct in saying that there is a difference, then the McDonnell Douglas
Court must have been "sloppy" in summarizing its own opinion. However, he contend-
ed that the McDonnell Douglas Court's diction was consistent, not sloppy. See id.
89. See id. at 531 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (em-
phasis added).
91. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added).
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directly at odds with the specific requirements actually set out
in Burdine.2
The dissent also emphasized that Burdine provided that a
plaintiff may succeed by indirectly showing that the employer's
reasons were unworthy of credence simply because "employers
who discriminate [were] not likely to announce their discrimina-
tory motive."93 Contrary to this, the majority would require the
plaintiff to disprove not only the employer's stated reasons, but
also "all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder
might find lurking in the record.'9 This was simply too amor-
phous a requirement for the dissent.
A key passage in the dissenting opinion described the
majority's conflicting signals regarding the scope of its holding
in the case. Justice Souter noted the majority's language in one
passage, where it said that although proving the defendant's
reasons were false would not entitle plaintiff to judgment as a
matter of law, such evidence, without more would permit the
trier of fact to infer discrimination. 5 This supported the propo-
sition that the Court rejected the "pretext-plus" approach. On
the other hand, the Court's opinion also supported the "pretext-
plus" approach by providing that the plaintiff must show "both
that defendant's reasons were false and that discrimination was
the real reason." Justice Souter predicted that this "pretext-
plus" result would "turn Burdine on its head," and would in-
crease summary judgment for the employer when the plaintiff
proved a prima facie case and proved the employer's reasons
were unworthy of credence.97
Finally, Justice Souter considered the majority's reliance on
Aikens and Congress' role in approving the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Specifically, the dissent stated that Aikens flatly
barred the majority's conclusion that the factfinder could choose
92. See id. at 531 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
97. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The De-
fendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991) (criticizing the "pretext-plus"
approach).
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a third explanation, never offered by the employer, in ruling
against the plaintiff." Moreover, the dissent noted that Con-
gress had long been aware of the Court's interpretation of the
McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework, and had taken no
action to indicate that the Court was mistaken in McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine.9  The dissent concluded that the
majority's decision was unfair and impractical, and predicted
that the majority's decision would produce some remarkable
results.'o
IV. HICKS CIRCUIT COURT PROGENY
Since the Hicks decision, the debate has continued, focusing
on whether the "pretext" or the "pretext-plus" position is cor-
rect. Language in the Supreme Court's opinion supports at least
two different approaches.1 ' Some critics believe that Hicks
significantly altered the litigation in age and other discrimina-
tion claims.' 2 The various circuit courts of appeals continue to
be divided on the interpretation of Hicks in age discrimination
cases.
98. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also stated
that the sentence in Aikens directing the district court to "decide which party's expla-
nation of the employer's motivation it believes," creates more problems for the majori-
ty because it requires the factfinder to choose only between the employer's explana-
tion and the plaintiffs explanation, not a third explanation. Id. (quoting United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
99. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 538 (Souter, J., dissenting). "he majority's scheme therefore leads
to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory reasons
for their own decisions to hire and fire employees not only will benefit from lying,
but must lie, to defend successfully against a disparate-treatment action." Id. at 539-
40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. See discussion infra Parts IVA-B.
102. See William C. Kendel, Age Discrimination Recent Decisions by Appellate
Courts Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act through Mid-1996, in 3 25th
ANNUAL INSTrrUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAw 7, 118 (1996). ("The most significant Su-
preme Court decision affecting the ADEA practitioner came in a Title VII case, St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks . . . "); see also Rappaport, supra note 4, at 157 ('The





The First Circuit Court of Appeals subscribed to the more
stringent "pretext-plus" approach in deciding ADEA cases even
before the Hicks decision.1" Likewise, after the Hicks decision
the court afi ed its position in Udo v. Tomes."' Udo, a phy-
sician, alleging that the Department of Health had laid him off
in violation of the ADEA, was required to show: (1) that the
employer's articulated reason for laying him off was pretextual;
and (2) that the true reason was discriminatory.0 5 The First
Circuit further circumscribed the ambiguous "pretext-only" lan-
guage in Hicks by construing it to mean "[w]hile the plaintiff
may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and dis-
crimination, the evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable
factfinder to infer that the employer's decision was motivated
by discriminatory animus."' The First Circuit has obviously
decided its cases utilizing the "pretext-plus" language in Hicks
to the exclusion of the "pretext-only" language also in Hicks.
The Second Circuit's approach concerning pretext has vacil-
lated over the years, °'1 but that court seems to adhere to the
"pretext-plus" position. In Galo v. Prudential Services, °5 the
Second Circuit accepted Hicks as requiring ADEA plaintiffs to
prove the two-step inquiry that the defendant's reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason."° Gallo
was fired at age fifty because of an alleged reduction-in-force;
she was not rehired despite her qualifications and the availabil-
103. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming sum-
mary judgment for the employer because of the plaintiffs failure to demonstrate dis-
criminatory animus); Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816 (lst Cir. 1991).
104. 54 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1995).
105. See id. at 12.
106. Id. at 13.
107. See Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[Plaintiff, upon
whom the ultimate burden of persuasion rests, must show that the proffered reasons
were the defendant's true reasons and that age was the fact that resulted in the
employer's decision not to hire him."). But cf. Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.,
936 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the plaintiffs burden at the pretext
stage as meeting merely a one-step test, to show that the "employers's proffered ex-
planation is unworthy of credence.").
108. 22 F.3d 1219 (2d Cir. 1994).
109. See id. at 1225.
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ity of positions at the company."' The court held that "Gallo
must demonstrate that the reduction-in-force at least in her
individual case was a pretext for intentional age discrimina-
tion,""' and she must be permitted to show that the
"employer's asserted reasons for discharging her were a pretext
and that the real reason was her age."" The court, however,
muddied this seemingly clear interpretation of "pretext-plus"
language when it stated that Gallo could prove pretext by rely-
ing on her prima facie evidence, without any additional evi-
dence to show that the employer's reasons for her discharge
were false."' The Second Circuit is still grappling with the
distinction between "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus," because
language supporting the use of both tests was relied upon by
the court.
In a later decision by the Second Circuit, the court used
somewhat clearer "pretext-plus" language."" In this case, how-
ever, the court never applied this approach to the facts because
the district court awarded summary judgment to the employer.
The plaintiff never had an opportunity to prove that the true
reason he was discharged was his age." Therefore, the Sec-
ond Circuit will likely spawn a variety of decisions regarding
what the plaintiff will be required to prove due to the split
decisions within the circuit.
The Fourth Circuit, like the First Circuit, has traditionally
subscribed to the "pretext-plus" rule."' Even the Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, retreated somewhat from the "pretext-plus" lan-
110. See ida at 1222-23.
111. Id. at 1226.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the
plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate 'that the proffered reason was not the
true reason for the employment decision,' but was in fact a pretext for discrimina-
tion.").
115. See id. at 18. Courts have applied variants of the "pretext-only" and "pretext-
plus" positions to the issue of summary judgment. The Second Circuit explicitly stat-
ed, for example, that to survive summary judgment, "the plaintiff must establish a
genuine issue of material fact... as to whether the employer's reason for dis-
charging her is false and as to whether it is more likely that a discriminatory reason
motivated the employer to make an adverse employment decision." Gallo, 22 F.3d at
1225 (emphasis added).
116. See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413 (4th Cir. 1991).
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guage used in Hicks in Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc."7 The
court stated that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
and after the defendant comes forward with nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions, "[t]he plaintiff must then bear the 'ulti-
mate burden of persuasion' and show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's explanations are pretextual or
otherwise unworthy of credence."'18 This use of the word "or"
between "pretextual" and "unworthy of credence" is indicative of
the one-step, "pretext-only" standard. The two-step, "pretext-
plus" model requires that two matters be proved: pretext and
age discrimination. Later in the decision, the court cited the
Hicks decision for the proposition that the factfinder must be-
lieve the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination and
disbelieve the employer.1 "
To support the Fourth Circuit's use of the "pretext-plus" ap-
proach, despite the more permissive language used in part of
the opinion, the court noted that it declined to follow the Ninth
Circuit's more lenient approach regarding summary judgment,
in light of the Supreme Court's precedent in Hicks. ° In keep-
ing with this statement, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for the employer in Henson because Henson failed in
her attempt to prove, through verbal discussions that took place
at the employer's business and through statistical evidence,
that the employer's reasons were unworthy of credence and
that the employer intentionally discriminated against her be-
cause of her age. 1
In addition to the First Circuit, which clearly adopts the
"pretext-plus" standard, and the Second and Fourth Circuits,
which seem to adopt the "pretext-plus" approach, the Eighth
Circuit has ruled more in favor of the two-step model. In
Krenick v. County of Le Sueur,'r an ADEA plaintiff was re-
quired to establish evidence that the defendant's proffered rea-
son was pretextual and that intentional age discrimination was
117. 61 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 275.
119. See id. at 276.
120. See id. at 274 n.3.
121. See id. at 275-77.
122. 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995).
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the true reason for the defendant's actions.' Once again, as
clear as this language seems to be, the court curiously contin-
ued that if the factfinder disbelieved the defendant's reason,
and the reason was accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity,
then this, together with a prima facie case, could suffice to
show discrimination.' The Eighth Circuit, like the Fourth
Circuit, nevertheless reinforced its "pretext-plus" approach by
affirming summary judgment for the defendant because the
plaintiff failed to prove the two steps required in "pretext-
plus."' 5
The Eighth Circuit has subsequently decided at least two
other cases, Ryther v. Kare 112 and Roxas v. Presentation
College,'27 using similar conflicting language. In Ryther, the
plaintiff was able to prevail on his age discrimination claim.
The court explained that the jury was permitted to find for the
plaintiff, even though the legal presumption of the prima facie
case was eliminated after the defendant had met its burden of
production.' The elements of the prima facie case used in
conjunction with pretextual evidence and disbelief of defendant's
reasons could be enough for plaintiff to prevail.' The two-
step model was bolstered by the statement "[t]his is not to say
that, for the plaintiff to succeed, simply proving pretext is
enough,""' indicating that the Eighth Circuit has continued to
adopt the "pretext-plus" standard.
Two months later, in Roxas, the court described the plaintiffs
burden, after the employer had proffered its nondiscriminatory
reasons, as one "burden [which] will not be met by simply
showing that the reason advanced by the employer was false;
rather, Roxas must demonstrate that a discriminatory animus
lies behind the defendants' neutral explanations."
123. See id. at 959.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 961.
126. 84 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 1996).
127. 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996).
128. See Ryther, 84 F.3d at 1079-80.
129. See id. at 1078 n.4.
130. Id.
131. Roxas, 90 F.3d at 316 (citing Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d
771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995)).
864
PRETEXT PLUS
The Ninth Circuit decided two unpublished cases recently
which indicate it ascribes to the two-step model of showing
pretext. In Bergan,"2 the court found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case, but was not able to show that
his employer's reason for firing him was a pretext, and that age
discrimination was the true reason for his termination.' The
court stated that the mere fact that he had established a prima
facie case alone was not sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to conclude that the employer's explanation was
pretextual.' After reviewing Bergan's, arguments allegedly
rebutting the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons,
the court held that Bergan had failed to show the employer's
reasons were false and that age discrimination existed.' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of summary
judgment.' Two months later, in Neal,"7 the Ninth Circuit
again affirmed summary judgment for the employer because the
plaintiff was unable to raise a triable issue of fact that age dis-
crimination was the "real reason" for his termination.'
Employers litigating in circuit courts of appeal that recognize
the "pretex-plus" standard often circumvent the fear that a
plaintiffs case will be heard by a jury because the two-step
approach often results in the plaintiffs case being dismissed at
the summary judgment stage. Because age is a relative charac-
teristic-that is, everyone becomes older-age discrimination
plaintiffs are said to draw great sympathy from jurors. 9
"This is caused in part by the general respect accorded the
elderly in American society. An additional factor ... is the
older average age of jurors .... In excess of 70 percent of all
jurors are forty years of age or older."' 4 Because of this, em-
ployers are cognizant of the fact that once an age discrimina-
132. Bergan v. Standard Duplicating Mach. Corp., No. 95-35364, 1996 WL 422876
(9th Cir. July 29, 1996).
133. See id. at *1.
134. See id.
135. See id. at *2.
136. See id. at *1.
137. Neal v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 94-55635, 1996 WL 289985 (9th Cir.
May 31, 1996).
138. See id. at *1.
139. See O'MEARA, supra note 17, at 109.
140. Id.
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tion plaintiff overcomes a motion for summary judgment, his
chances of prevailing in front of a jury greatly increase.
B. "Pretext-Only" Circuits
The Third Circuit has long been a leading proponent of the
"pretext-only" approach in ADEA cases.' Since the Hicks de-
cision, the Third Circuit has continued, for the most part, to
utilize the one-step model of "pretext-only." The Third Circuit
did take a step in the other direction when it decided Seman v.
Coplay Cement Co.' In that case, the court explained that
Hicks explicitly rejected its "pretext-only" test for discrimination
and made clear that henceforth plaintiffs would have to prove
that the employer's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual
and that age was the real reason for the adverse action."
Specifically, the court stated that "[plroof of one without the
other will not suffice."'
Later, in Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc.,' the Third Circuit
reverted to a "pretext-only" construction of Hicks, but only at
the summary judgment stage, by stating that "[c]ontrary to the
district's court's prediction.., we joined those of our sister
circuits who have read Hicks to require at summary judgment
'pretext-only."'" Stabilizing this position, the Third Circuit
articulated in Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp.,'
that if the plaintiff had sufficient evidence to discredit the
defendant's proffered reason, then no additional evidence was
needed beyond the prima facie case to avoid at least summary
judgment.'"
The Third Circuit is an example of a court requiring one
standard for summary judgment and another for trial. Its adop-
tion of the "pretext-only" standard for summary judgment is
141. See Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989); Sorba v. Penn-
sylvania Drilling Inc., 821 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1988); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987).
142. 26 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1994).
143. See id. at 438.
144. Id. at 438 & n.13.
145. 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995).
146. Id. at 495.
147. 72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995).
148. See id. at 331.
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more in line with the Hicks decision than the Fourth Circuit's
approach."' The Fourth Circuit has used a "pretext-plus"
standard for summary judgment, imposing a heavier burden on
the plaintiff.' Arguably this is inconsistent with the Hicks
decision, as Hicks was not a summary judgment case; Hicks
was fully tried.'5
The Hicks decision has had an irresolute impact on ADEA
cases in the Fifth Circuit, but it appears that the court is lean-
ing toward a "pretext-only" standard. In Bodenheimer v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 2 the Fifth Circuit noted that prior to Hicks,
confusion had reigned among the circuits regarding whether a
plaintiff could prove employment discrimination simply by
showing that the defendant's reasons were not credible.' The
court went on to say that Hicks had resolved this issue by con-
cluding that "the plaintiff must prove.., that the employer's
reasons were not the true reason for the employment decision
and that unlawful discrimination was."' Hicks remains a
source of difficulty, however, because three years later in
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools," the Fifth Circuit retreated
somewhat from its earlier position by using "pretext-only" lan-
guage in its opinion.' Later that year, Rhodes was cited in
Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hospital' for the proposition that a
prima facie case, together with evidence supporting the rejec-
149. See discussion supra Part IV.A_
150. See discussion supra Part VA.
151. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
152. 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993).
153. See id. at 957.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996).
156. The court used the familiar language from the Hicks opinion:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show inten-
tional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons,
will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional dis-
crimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that,
upon such rejection, "[no additional proof of discrimination is re-
quired . . . "
Id. at 993 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
157. 92 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
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tion of the employer's reasons, "will often, perhaps usually,
permit a finding of discrimination without additional evi-
dence.""
Employers litigating in circuit courts of appeal that follow the
"pretext-only" approach may feel that hiring older workers re-
sults in more litigation. "A Conference Board survey of large
employers asked for reasons for refusing to hire older appli-
cants. Among the reasons was the '[r]isk of an age discrimina-
tion suit if employee [sic] does not work out and has to be
terminated.'" 9 This attitude and the fact that juries are sym-
pathetic to age discrimination plaintiffs make the use of the
"pretext-only" approach even more controversial.
C. Modified Test Circuits
Some circuit courts have interpreted the Hicks decision as
requiring neither "pretext-plus" nor "pretext-only." Instead,
courts like the Sixth Circuit believe that Hicks only clarified
that the effect of the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation
is to convert the inference of discrimination, established by the
prima facie case, from a mandatory one which the jury must
draw, to a permissive one the jury may draw, if the jury finds
the employer's reasons "unworthy" of belief." In Manzer, the
court stated that "the Supreme Court rejected the 'pretext only'
position and held that a mere finding that the reasons given by
the employer 'were not the real reasons' for firing plaintiff and
did not compel judgment for plaintiff." 6'
The Manzer court contemporaneously found that the Supreme
Court, in Hicks, also rejected the "pretext-plus" position.'62
158. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994).
159. O7MEARA, supra note 17, at 3 (alteration in original).
160. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir.
1994).
161. Id. (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11).
162. See id. The Court, however, also rejected the "pretext-plus" position, stating:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show inten-




The Manzer court characterized the Sixth Circuit as tradition-
ally being a "pretext-plus" proponent before Hicks." After
Hicks, the Sixth Circuit, through its opinion in Manzer, adopted
a modified test based upon Hicks and Burdine. This test em-
phasized that once the employer proffered its reasons for engag-
ing in the adverse action, the plaintiff had to produce sufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject the
employer's explanation.' The court found that every circuit
to address the impact of Hicks on the submissibility of employ-
ment discrimination cases had reached the same conclusion.'
As a result, the mere elements of a prima facie case are not
sufficient, because allowing the plaintiff to meet her burden
simply through the prima facie case would render illusory the
entire burden of proof requirement set forth in McDonnell
Douglas and its successors." The court ultimately decided
that since Manzer did not produce any evidence, beyond that
which established his prima facie case, indicating that age
played any part in his termination.67 Therefore, the district
court did not err in granting the employer's motion for a direct-
ed verdict at the close of all the evidence."
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted a modified "pretext-
plus" test. In Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 9 the court
opined that there were three possible constructions of pre-
text.170 The Seventh Circuit stated that if the employer offered
a pretext as its justification, then it followed a version of the
"pretext-plus" rule, permitting the trier of fact to infer that the
163. See id. at 1082.
164. See id. at 1083.
165. See id. at 1083 n.3 (citing Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.
1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993)).
166. See id. at 1084.
167. See id. at 1085.
168. See id.
169. 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
170. See id. at 1122. The court described one version of the "pretext-plus" rule
which states that if the plaintiff can successfully show that the reasons proffered by
the employer for her discharge are factually false, then she is automatically entitled
to judgment. Another version of the "pretext-plus" rule states that if the employer
offers a pretext for why it discharged plaintiff, then the factfinder is permitted, not
compelled, to infer that the real reason was age. Finally, the "pretext-plus" rule
states that a plaintiff must show both that the employer's reasons are false and di-
rect evidence that the employer's real reason was discriminatory. See id.
1997] 869
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:847
real reason for the employer's actions was age discrimina-
tion.171 In Anderson, the court held that Hicks allowed the
plaintiff to prevail, not automatically as a matter of law, but
through submission of her case to the ultimate factfinder, if the
plaintiff proved a prima facie case and showed that the
employer's proffered reasons for her discharge were false.'
The Anderson court also cited Hicks as saying that the ulti-
mate burden was still on the plaintiff to prove that she was
intentionally discriminated against.' The Court stated that
the plaintiff might be well advised to present additional evi-
dence of discrimination." It noted that McDonnell Douglas
and Hicks spoke about the burden the plaintiff bore at trial and
that for summary judgment purposes, the non-moving party
had a lesser burden than the one imposed at trial.'75 The Sev-
enth Circuit's modified standard is thus: a plaintiff can defeat a
motion for summary judgment by proving that the employer's
proffered reasons for its actions were false. The plaintiff, how-
ever, has the ultimate burden of proving intentional age dis-
crimination in order to prevail at trial, which may require addi-
tional evidence beyond the prima facie case and proof of pre-
text.
In two recent cases since Anderson, this standard was fol-
lowed. In Weisbrot v. Medical College of Wisconsin,16 the
court reiterated the language used in Anderson. When an em-
ployer articulates nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the employer's reasons
are false, and the plaintiff also retains the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally en-
gaged in age discrimination.1 77 The court in Weisbrot, howev-
er, affirmed summary judgment because Weisbrot could not
show pretext. 78 The court did not reach the "pretext-plus" is-
sue. Similarly, in Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Electronics,1
79
171. See id. at 1122-23.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1124.
175. See id.
176. 79 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 1996).
177. See id. at 681.
178. See id. at 685.
179. 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996).
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the court stated that summary judgment would be improper if
the plaintiff offered evidence which could support an inference
of age discrimination; no other evidence was needed.180 The
court ultimately afirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
again, because Fuka was unable to show that the employer's
reasons for her discharge were false.'8'
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit recently spoke in Isenbergh5 2
about the confusion created by Hicks. In determining whether
Isenbergh proved the employer's reason false and the existence
of age discrimination, the court noted that there was some
conflict in the case law from the Eleventh Circuit."s The issue
was whether the plaintiff could carry her burden of proof just
by showing that the employer's reasons for the employment
decision were pretextual." The Eleventh Circuit explained
that the Hicks decision did not decide cases involving Rule
50' or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so
the Supreme Court's analysis did not apply to those types of
cases.' Nevertheless, there was a conflict in the law about
"whether Hicks always preclude[d] judgments as a matter of
law for employers whenever there [was] a plausible basis on
180. See id. at 1404.
181. See id. at 1406.
182. Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir.
1996).
183. See id. at 441.
184. See id.
185. Federal Rule of Procedure 50 concerns judgment as a matter of law in actions
tried by juries. It states in relevant part:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against that party ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
186. See Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 441. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 concerns
summary judgment. It states in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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which to disbelieve the employer's proffered reasons for the
employment decision in question."187
The Isenbergh court noted that Howard, a previous decision
in the Eleventh Circuit, concluded that under Hicks, "'the fact
finder's rejection of defendant's proffered reasons is sufficient
circumstantial evidence upon which to base a judgment for the
plaintiff.'" " The Isenbergh court thought Howard was wrong,
however, in applying Hicks analysis to those types of cases
which were not before the Supreme Court in Hicks." Instead,
the Isenbergh court thought Hicks supported another conclusion:
when the evidentiary record in a case could support a jury's
disbelief of the employer's explanation, the court could "some-
times" refuse to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
to the employer, but not "every time." 90
Contrary to the decision in Howard, the Eleventh Circuit, in
NationsBank, accepted the plaintiff's contention that the
defendant's proffered reasons were false, but affirmed a directed
verdict for the defendant." The court explained that, al-
though the plaintiff had raised a suspicion of mendacity, it was
not sufficient to show that age motivated the defendant's termi-
nation decision. 2 The court explained that once the defen-
dant had met its burden of production, the sole inquiry would
be whether the plaintiff successfully carried the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant engaged in inten-
tional age discrimination.9 3 Deciding whether the plaintiff
proved the defendant's reasons were false would be probative,
but not dispositive.'9 The Isenbergh court found NationsBank
to be the more correct statement of the law.'
187. Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 441.
188. Id. at 442 (quoting Howard v. BP Oil, 32 F.3d. 520, 527 (11th Cir. 1994)).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Walker v. NationsBank of Fla., 53 F.3d 1548, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1995).
192. See id. at 1558.
193. See id. at 1557.
194. See id.
195. See Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 443. For a further explanation of why the Isenbergh
court agreed with the decision in NationsBank, see Senior Justice Johnson's concur-
ring opinion at pages 1560-65.
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After noting the ostensible conflict within the circuit,' the
court went on to dismiss Howard as controlling, because
Isenbergh failed to create an issue of fact about the validity of
the employer's reason.' In other words, the court did not
have to decide what impact the Hicks decision would have on
this case, because the plaintiff could not prove pretext. It af-
firmed the district court's award of summary judgment for the
defendant.
Based on the decision in Isenbergh, the Eleventh Circuit
appears to have adopted a modified version of the "pretext-plus"
and "pretext-only" standards in ADEA cases. Isenbergh suggests
the possibility that a plaintiff will not overcome a motion for
summary judgment or survive a motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law by proving the employer's stated reasons to be
false." S At the same time, a plaintiff may defeat one or both
of these motions if, in proving the defendant's reasons false, the
evidence reveals suspicions of mendacity sufficient to infer in-
tentional discrimination.'
D. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers"°°
O'Connor is the United States Supreme Court's most recent
decision involving age discrimination. The narrow question in
this case was whether a plaintiff alleging that he was dis-
charged because of his age must show that he was replaced by
someone outside the protected group of individuals. age forty
and over.2"' In answering this question in the negative, the
Court did not address the issue of whether a "pretext-plus" or
"pretext-only" standard would be applied had the plaintiff been
able to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case. It merely cited Hicks for the proposition that once a
196. The court described the conflict as ostensible because Howard was a summary
judgment (Rule 56) case and NationsBank was a judgment as a matter of law (Rule
50) case. The court said that "the words of the NationsBank opinion might be incon-
sistent with the words of the Howard opinion, yet the two decisions might not be
conflicting." Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 443 n.4.
197. See Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 443.
198. See id. at 441.
199. See id.
200. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
201. See id. at 1309.
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prima facie case has been supported by a preponderance of the
evidence and the employer remains silent, the court then must
enter judgment for the plaintiff."2 If the employer remains si-
lent instead of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for its actions, however, the "pretext-plus" or "pretext-only"
controversy would not arise.
The circuit court and district court opinions similarly do not
address which standard would be applied. However, O'Connor is
a Fourth Circuit case and that circuit bas traditionally adhered
to the "pretext-plus" position. °3 In any event, both the district
court and the Fourth Circuit determined that O'Connor had not
established a prima facie case. Therefore, the employer was
awarded summary judgment. Beyond the elements necessary to
establish a prima facie case, no analysis was performed.'"
E. The EEOC's Interpretation
The EEOC has interpreted Hicks to mean that, although the
plaintiff is not required to produce additional evidence of intent
to discriminate where the employer's explanation for its actions
is found not to be credible, it does, as a practical matter, per-
mit a fact finder to require such affirmative evidence.0 5 This
is contrary to the EEOC's position prior to Hicks.
The EEOC's previous position presumed that there was dis-
crimination when the employer's explanation was not credi-
ble.2" The EEOC has directed its investigators to assume that
if the evidence shows the respondent's articulated reasons are
untrue, the employer is trying to cover up discrimination;
hence, a finding of "cause" is appropriate.20 This guidance has
remained in effect after Hicks. According to the EEOC, even
though Hicks clearly holds that showing that an employer's
articulated reason is untrue does not compel a finding of liabili-
202. See id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 & n.3
(1993)).
203. See discussion supra Part IVA
204. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1308-10.
205. See Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Employer
EEO Respons. (EEOC) Tab E, 5 n.6 (Apr. 12, 1994).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 6.
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ty, it is also clear that such a finding is permitted."' In addi-
tion, even before Hicks, EEOC investigators would issue a find-
ing of "no cause" when the evidence clearly showed that the
respondent's articulated reasons for its action were untrue and
that a nondiscriminatory reason not articulated by the respon-
dent was the true motive.2" This principle has remained the
same.
V. ANALYSIS
The Hicks decision poses more questions than it answers.
Two of the open issues indirectly accentuated by the Hicks
decision include: (1) whether a different test should be applied
at different time intervals in the litigation, such as defendant's
motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law; and (2) whether the Supreme Court
was intentionally vague in Hicks in order to permit a future
court to make fact-specific determinations based upon the spe-
cific language in Hicks that bolsters its conclusion. Depending
upon how a court applies Hicks, it could dismiss a plaintiffs
suit at summary judgment using the "pretext-plus" language, or
it could use the "pretext-only" language in Hicks to permit the
plaintiff to proceed through trial and let the jury infer discrimi-
nation. The only clear ruling of the Court was that showing the
defendant's proffered reasons to be pretextual does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.210
As the above analysis reveals, a number of circuit court deci-
sions have adopted at least three tests in interpreting the Hicks
decision.21 ' Some circuits have adopted the "pretext-plus" or
"pretext-only" test and, in doing so, have ignored the language
in Hicks supporting the other test.2 1 Other circuit courts have
combined "pretext plus" and "pretext only" language in their
opinions, resulting in an uncertain standard to be used by fu-
ture courts. The use of Hicks in this way has and will re-
208. See id.
209. See id. at 7.
210. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
211. See discussion supra Part IV.
212. See discussion supra Part IVA-B.
213. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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suit in inconsistent and unpredictable results. Other circuits
have begun to adopt a modified test.214 The Sixth, Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the "pretext-plus" or "pre-
text-only" tests. These courts use the "pretext-plus" and "pre-
text-only" language, but in permissive rather than mandatory
terms.215
There are problems associated with adopting exclusively one
test or the other. The problem with requiring proof of "pretext
plus" is that some courts have applied the two-step method at
an early stage in the proceedings. The Fourth Circuit, for ex-
ample, has required plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage
to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reasons were a
pretext and that the real reason for the adverse action was
age.216 This can result in the premature dismissal of the
plaintiffs case. Hicks was filly tried and arguably does not
apply to summary judgment cases.217 Plaintiffs may be unable
to overcome motions for summary judgment facing the "pretext-
plus" standard because they are not given a fair opportunity to
develop their case, through discovery' or through cross-exam-
ination of witnesses, for example.
The "pretext only" approach is also problematic, because a
prima facie case is often easily established, and because a
plaintiff could prove the employer's reasons to be false without
pointing to any age-based reason. A plaintiff must ultimately
convince the trier of fact that age was a motivating factor in
the employer's decision.
The Supreme Court in Hicks correctly adopted a hybrid of
the "pretext only" and "pretext plus" approaches. The Supreme
Court answered in the negative the narrow question before it of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law after proving the employer's reasons false." The Supreme
Court proceeded to explain what the plaintiff was required to
prove to prevail. The plaintiff could prevail in two ways: (1) by
214. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
217. See Hicks, 509 U.S. 502.
218. A defendant could move the court for summary judgment after it files its re-
sponsive pleadings and before discovery is commenced much less completed.
219. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
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establishing a prima facie case and proving pretext involving
aggravated facts; or (2) by proving pretext and that age was the
real reason for the employer's adverse action' ° The Supreme
Court maintained that the language in its decision was not
conflicting, as the dissent argued, because it was not adopting
one single test."
This hybrid, or modified test, allows courts to exercise flexi-
bility in evaluating the specific facts on a case by case basis.
The Court was suspicious of employers who asserted unbeliev-
able, nondiscriminatory reasons to justify their actions.' That
is why it incorporated in its opinion the language that the
factfinder's disbelief combined with a suspicion of mendacity
and a prima facie case could suffice to show intentional dis-
crimination. On the other hand, the Court was also wary of the
plaintiff with a weak prima facie case and a shallow attack on
the employer's nondiscriminatory reason; hence, the reason for
the language that a plaintiff must prove both pretext and dis-
crimination.
The modified test removes artificial barriers to the truth-
seeking process because it does not necessarily require the proof
of "pretext-plus" at the summary judgment stage. It also does
not allow unwarranted judgments for plaintiffs simply because
the plaintiff was able to show only that the employer's reasons
were false. This modified test utilizes the McDonnell Douglas
tripartite test as a framework through which evidence is logi-
cally presented, not as a substantive test to determine whether
the plaintiff will prevail.
Finally, Hicks did not resolve the "pretext-plus" versus "pre-
text-only" controversy as evidenced by the multiple tests gener-
ated by the post-Hicks decisions outlined above.2" What Hicks
did do was establish a modified test which reasonably serves
the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. The Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Eleventh Circuits appropriately emphasize that the
plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
220. See id. at 506.
221. See id. at 516-17.
222. See id. at 519.
223. See id. at 515.
224. See discussion supra Part IV.
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that age was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.2
Probative factors which will assist the trier of fact in inferring
discrimination include: whether the plaintiff can prove pretext,
whether sufficient suspicion of mendacity exists, and whether
there is any direct evidence proving age discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hicks decision has generated at least three approaches:
"pretext-plus," "pretext-only," and the modified test. In deter-
mining which approach best reflects the intent Congress had
when enacting the ADEA, it is clear that the modified test is
the most appropriate. In enacting the ADEA, Congress sought,
inter alia, to remove the setting of arbitrary age limits in em-
ployment. This would be difficult to achieve if courts stringently
used the "pretext-plus" standard. This standard would surround
the jury box with artificial barriers which plaintiffs are unlikely
to overcome. Strictly adhering to the "pretext-only" standard,
however, would discourage employers from hiring older workers
out of the fear of a lawsuit should the employer rightfully ter-
minate an older worker. Finally, the modified test combines
elements of both the "pretext-plus" and "pretext-only" stan-
dards. Under this approach, more meritorious claims may pro-
ceed to the jury, while more frivolous suits will be dismissed.
This should serve as a model for other circuit courts to follow.
Susan Childers North
225. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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